di Cesco Reale
Pubblico qui dei miei appunti (in inglese, chiedo venia) di teoria dei giochi, se qualcuno avesse dei commenti in merito puó scrivermi all’indirizzo email contenuto nel pdf e saró lieto di rispondere.
Il secondo pdf è una selezione delle parti principali.
100828-HowMuchIsConvenientToDefect.pdf
101117-HowMuchIsConvenientToDefect-highlights.pdf
How much is convenient to defect ?
A method to estimate the cooperation probability in Prisoner’s Dilemma and other games
In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimen-
tal players’ behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed
here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the di erent op-
tions will be actually chosen by the players. These probabilities can also
be interpreted as competitive mixed strategies. The method is shaped on
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, then generalized for asymmetric tables, N players
and N options. It is adapted to other conditions like Chicken Game, Bat-
tle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt and then applied to other games like Diner’s
Dilemma, Public Goods Game, Traveler’s Dilemma and War of Attrition.
These games are so analyzed in a probabilistic way that is consistent to
what we could expect intuitively, overcoming some known paradoxes of
the Game Theory.